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The purpose of this thesis is to assess administrative policies and procedures 
regarding sexual assault on college and university campuses in the United States, 
with the goal of determining which have been effective and which have not. This 
assessment will be done by first providing an overview of the history of attitudes 
towards sexual assault, followed by a summary of the contemporary climate 
regarding sexual assault on college campuses. Four specific universities will be 
assessed in terms of their efficacy in preventing and responding to sexual assault 
cases on their specific campuses. The research ultimately shows that effective 
policies and procedures are those including large amounts of student input, while 
the least effective are administrative, with a more top-down effect. Colleges and 
universities that attempt to be inclusive of all student identities and recognize the 
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Introduction 
Sexual assault on college campuses has been a long-standing problem in the 
United States. In recent years, situations in which a university or college has failed 
to adequately respond to the safety and wellness needs of their students in days or 
weeks following a sexual assault have become a more prominent focus in 
mainstream media. The case that initially drew the most attention occurred at 
Harvard University in June 2013. A female student was forced to live in the same 
residence hall (or “House,” as residence halls are referred to on the Harvard 
campus) as a male student for nine months after he sexually assaulted her. In a 
widely circulated anonymous op-ed piece in the Harvard student newspaper, The 
Harvard Crimson, the student details how Harvard did nothing to address her 
physical and psychological distress. The university claimed her assailant had not 
violated the student code of conduct, a code last updated in 1993 and containing no 
definitions of sexual assault nor of consent. Administrative response to her request 
to transfer her assailant to a different House were met with “it [is] a bad time of the 
semester,” “there [will] be consequences for [your] assailant anyway,” “we shouldn’t 
go through the process if it [is] going to be fruitless,” “[your] assailant [can’t] be 
punished because he didn’t know what he was doing,” “forgive [him] and move on,” 
and a question regarding whether the student’s drinking habits were the problem, 
as “it seemed like they had led to my sexual assault.” (Anonymous, 2014). 
Eventually, after being diagnosed with depression, an anxiety disorder, and suicidal 
tendencies eight months after the assault, the student put in a request to transfer 
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herself out of her House, stating that, although she originally believed she shouldn’t 
be the one to have to move as she had done nothing wrong, the university’s inaction 
has forced her to put in the request, “if only – quite literally – to save my life” 
(Anonymous, 2014).  
Instances such as these have drawn national attention to what is quickly 
being deemed an epidemic. Universities such as Dartmouth College, the University 
of Iowa, Emory University, Occidental College, the University of California, Berkeley, 
Tufts University, Vanderbilt University, and the University of Nevada, Reno are 
taking a step back and evaluating their current policies to address and prevent 
sexual assault; however, there are many institutions, such as Princeton University, 
Boston University, Swarthmore College, the University of Southern California, 
Florida State University, the University of Michigan, and Penn State University, as 
well as the aforementioned Harvard University, that have not responded to the 
media attention and are not attempting to make any changes to inadequate or 
outdated procedures (Steinhauer & Joachim, 2014). In response to the lack of effort 
from university administrators, a number of university students are engaging in 
individual or group protests, or forming movements to demand that their campuses 
improve the resources available to survivors.  
Another such instance of a poorly handled sexually assault case occurred in 
September 2014 at Columbia University, one of the aforementioned institutions that 
did not attempt to make any changes to its policies and procedures addressing 
sexual assault even after the media caused a national outcry. In this case, Emma 
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Sulkowicz, a senior female student at the university, began carrying her dorm 
mattress around campus, vowing that she would not stop until the university took 
administrative action against her alleged rapist. Sulkowicz states the assault took 
place in her university dorm room on the very same 20-pound mattress. Sulkowicz’s 
performance-art protest inspired “collective carry” acts of solidarity on other 
campuses across the nation, such as Centenary College in Louisiana, Dickinson 
College in Pennsylvania, and Arizona State University (Taylor, 2014). 
Instances such as these “collective carry” protests, as well as the 
undergraduate student response to the “Dear Harvard: You Win” op-ed piece, in 
which a large portion of Harvard students abandoned the tradition of decorating 
their graduation caps with records of their undergraduate experiences, instead 
choosing to spell out “IX” in red tape to protest Harvard’s mishandling of Title IX 
sexual assault cases, have received the bulk of media attention because they have 
taken place on Ivy League university campuses (Friend, 2014). However, these 
problems also are present on campuses not considered as “elite” as Ivy League 
schools. Florida State University has been accused of mishandling a sexual assault 
case involving its football team’s quarterback, Jameis Winston, with Winston’s 
accuser arguing that the university delayed properly addressing the situation with a 
student conduct hearing in order to allow Winston to finish out the football season 
(Bogdanich, 2014). Similarly, the University of Oregon has recently drawn media 
attention for filing a counterclaim against an anonymous female student’s lawsuit 
alleging that the university recruited a male athlete for the men’s basketball team 
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with the full knowledge that the man had been accused of sexual assault at his 
previous institution. The anonymous female student accused the athlete and two 
other members of the men’s basketball team of sexually assaulting her, and while 
the University of Oregon has expelled the three students, the school has come under 
fire for requesting access to the female student’s medical records (including 
psychiatric records and potentially sexual history) when filing the counterclaim 
against her lawsuit (Kingkade, University of Oregon Says, 2015).  
 Large, public, Research I institutions such as Florida State University and the 
University of Oregon draw a diverse range of students, due to their typically lower 
tuition rates when compared to private universities and colleges. As public entities, 
more systems of accountability exist regarding their policies and procedures, as 
they are typically state-funded and receive research grants from the federal 
government, meaning tax-paying citizens contribute to these institutions. Therefore, 
large, public, Research I universities, typically the flagship universities in their 
respective states, have more of a social responsibility to set the tone when it comes 
to addressing issues of sexual assault, as oftentimes they serve as a type of role 
model for other state universities (Ayers & Hurd, 2005). It is for these reasons of 
accessibility and accountability that I have chosen to focus on four different large, 
public, Research I institutions in four different state university systems when 
assessing the efficacy of campus responses to sexual assault. 
A broad discussion arising from the spotlight on this problem is, what are 
appropriate procedures a university needs to follow when addressing a sexual 
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assault case? What are universities already doing, and what could they be doing 
better? What do survivors of sexual assault on a university campus need in terms of 
support in order to still succeed in their college career? How can these occurrences 
be prevented?  
 The goal of asking these types of questions is to determine what is and is not 
working in terms of how universities are responding to instances of sexual assault. 
It is not anticipated that a singular, most effective strategy will be determined 
through this research, as all universities are different and all universities have 
differing student cultures. What may work well on one campus may have no effect 
on another, but an assessment of various actions regarding sexual assault cases on 
multiple campuses will help to shed light on what could potentially work on certain 
campuses, particularly large, public, Research I institutions.   
 Current policies and procedures addressing sexual assault on various types 
of universities across the nation, with a focus on large, public, Research I 
institutions, will be assessed in this paper, including whether or not these policies 
and procedures address the issues of intersectionality raised by the historical 
dialogue surrounding sexual assault in the United States, as well as the 
contemporary intersectionality referenced by Salamishah Tillet. I will start with an 
overview of the broader historical context of sexual assault in the United States, in 
order to provide a framework for the current discussion. This framework will 
reference the intersectionality of sexual assault and race, as well as sexual assault 
and class, and how failure to recognize this intersectionality has disenfranchised 
CAMPUS RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN ANALYSIS                 6             
both those accused of sexual assault and sexual assault survivors. I will then move 
into a discussion of the contemporary issue of sexual assault on college campuses, 
focusing on media response and public policy provoked by such a response. I will 
follow with an analysis of examples of poorly managed sexual assault cases, which 
reflect ineffective administrative policies and procedures, at Florida State University 
and the University of Oregon (both large, public, Research I institutions), 
demonstrating the severity of the problem. However, I will then move into an 
analysis of effective administrative responses to sexual assault cases demonstrated 
by the University of California, Berkeley and the University of Washington, which 
can potentially serve as best practices for large, public, Research I institutions 
across the United States. Finally, a review of student and administrative action in 
order to address the problem of sexual assault on college campuses, and the most 
effective and least effective actions taken by such large, public, Research I 
institutions, will be discussed. 
 This thesis is interdisciplinary in nature and therefore may not align with the 
traditional concept of a thesis. There is very little quantitative data regarding sexual 
assault on college and university campuses. This lack of data can be attributed to 
many causes. Many sexual assault survivors choose not to report their assaults for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from having a personal relationship with their attacker, 
to feeling that they would not be believed if they were to report, or to simply not 
wishing to discuss the assault because they are attempting to forget it ever 
happened. Even when survivors of sexual assaults on college and university 
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campuses do report their assaults, this information is often not readily available due 
to a lack of transparency in university administration, a problem the federal 
government is seeking to address, as I will reference later in this paper. This lack of 
“hard” data means that the research draws from less traditional types of sources, 
such as police reports, lawsuits filed against universities and the universities’ 
countermotions, media coverage of sexual assault on college campuses, university 
student codes of conduct, bills currently going through the United States Congress, 
university statements and press releases, student-based and community-based 
petitions, university task force reports, grassroots tools for student activists, and 
letters to university administrators. These may not be considered purely academic 
or purely primary sources, but the topic of campus sexual assault is not an area that 
has been deeply analyzed in an academic context, nor is it a discussion with a wealth 
of primary sources available. This lack of sources can be seen as an indication of the 
nature of the problem; campus sexual assault is not something that research is 
focused on. The majority of the traditional academic sources will be in the historical 
context section; the rest of the thesis will largely draw from less traditional sources.  
This analysis will determine both best and worst practices addressing sexual 
assault response and prevention at large, public, Research I institutions. These 
results will add to the framework of how sexual assault is addressed in today’s 
political climate, and contribute to a better understanding of how universities can 
best enact both prevention procedures to reduce campus sexual rates, and survivor 
treatment policies to improve support systems on university campuses. 
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Background of Attitudes Towards Sexual Assault in the United States 
 Sexual assault in the United States has a complicated history, one that must 
be taken into consideration when addressing the current issue of sexual assault on 
college campuses. The intersection of sexual assault and race looms large in the 
context surrounding sexual assault, particularly during the time of the civil rights 
movement and in Southern regions of the United States. With a renewed 
commitment to recognizing the impact of “social justice and the continued 
diversification in today’s higher education environment,” resulting in the inclusion 
of an “Equity and Diversity” Focus Area in the list of core competencies promoted by 
NASPA (National Association of Student Personnel Administrators), such 
intersectionality is also very relevant on college campuses today (NASPA, 2015). 
Furthermore, addressing issues of diversity and race on college campuses has a 
history of divisiveness and controversy; similarly, sexual assault has a history of 
being both a polarizing and unifying issue among disparate entities associated with 
the women’s rights movement in the United States. An overview of the literature 
surrounding the history of sexual assault will help to shed some light on these 
important issues that come into play when discussing sexual assault in any context, 
and will provide a framework for analysis of the current climate associated with 
sexual assault on university campuses today. 
Issues surrounding sexual assault cases in the United States often include 
aspects of racism and sexism that have rarely been addressed. These issues must be 
considered when addressing any response to sexual assault, particularly on college 
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campuses with commitments to equity, diversity, and inclusiveness. Racism is 
deeply woven into the historical narrative addressing sexual assault in the United 
States. Black men accused of rape are more likely to receive a guilty conviction, 
particularly if the accuser is a white woman (Walsh, 2004). However, in addition to 
this trope of the “black beast rapist,” the trope of the “lying woman” also exists.  
Susan Estrich, a law professor at the University of Southern California, writes in the 
“Philosophical Issues in Rape Law” volume of Law and Philosophy that “no myth is 
more powerful in the tradition of rape law than the myth of the lying woman: the 
spurned lover who seeks revenge; the deflowered virgin who refuses to assume 
responsibility for her sexual activities; the vicious and spiteful woman who would 
lie about a rape charge” (Estrich, 1992).  This stereotype explains why so few rape 
cases, both historically and contemporarily, actually result in a conviction or a 
sentence, as it is often argued that the sexual encounter was consensual and the 
woman is lying about it being a case of sexual assault because she “regrets” 
whatever happened. In her article “The Giles-Johnson Case and the Changing Politics 
of Sexual Violence in the 1960s United States,” Catherine O. Jacquet discusses how 
these two tropes can ultimately work against each other, resulting in 
disenfranchisement of both women and black men. The article analyzes the Giles-
Johnson rape case in the 1960’s, in which three black men were accused of raping a 
white woman and the community rallied behind the men by accusing the woman of 
lying. Jacquet frames this case as an example of “the battles for racial and sexual 
equality [coming to be] understood as presenting competing interests” (Jacquet, 
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2013). It is true that more black men have been accused of rape than white men, 
more black men have been convicted of rape than white men, and more black men 
have received the death penalty for rape than did white men (Walsh, 2004). 
However, Jacquet argues that this information was misused in the Giles-Johnson 
case in the name of avoiding racial discrimination, but at the cost of the white 
woman’s rights. A history of prejudice against black men does not mean black men 
cannot be rapists, and using the method of invalidating the white woman accuser 
contributes to the trope of the “lying woman.” Jacquet discusses how the civil rights 
movement, in an attempt to decrease the amount of falsely accused black men, 
worked against the interests of women as a whole, including white women and 
women of color (although women of color face a different kind of 
disenfranchisement in sexual assault cases, as I will discuss later). Jacquet 
references the concept of the “Southern rape complex,” in which “a Southern white 
woman simply had to ‘cry rape,’ and ‘the white community would unconditionally 
unite behind her, demanding revenge that was ‘swift and fatal’” (Jacquet, 2013). In 
the Giles-Johnson case, the opposite happened: the white community united behind 
the three accused black men, and attempted to invalidate the white female accuser 
in many ways, including publicizing her “sexual promiscuity, bad behavior, and 
potential mental health issues” (Jacquet, 2013), a trend I will discuss later when 
analyzing a contemporary case at the University of Oregon. Jacquet’s analysis then 
merges into a discussion of the women that were not “worthy of protection” under 
the Southern rape complex, primarily women of lower class or women who didn’t 
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subscribe to gender norms (Jacquet, 2013), an issue women also face today when 
filing cases of sexual assault on college campuses (Testa et al., 2012). Overall, 
Jacquet is making the argument that historical attitudes towards race and sex in the 
South served to disenfranchise both women and black men in cases of sexual 
assault. These attitudes served as a foundation for addressing sexual assault as a 
whole, a foundation which still comes into play with sexual assault cases to this day. 
If attitudes towards sexual assault have historically dismissed the rights of 
women and black men, what about black women specifically? Intersectionality, or 
the overlap of multiple identities, has been discussed extensively in feminist theory 
ever since the concept was first introduced by Kimberle Crenshaw. It is best 
explained using the example of the 2008 presidential election, in which the 
democratic primary focused on Barack Obama as the potential first black president, 
and Hillary Clinton as the potential first woman president. However, what was 
implied through the dialogue surrounding this race was that “black” means male, 
and “woman” means white. Black women slipped through the cracks, so to say, in 
our national consciousness. This frequently happens to those with multiple 
identities. There are issues facing black people, and issues facing women, but there 
are also issues facing black women, and those often go unnoticed. It is important to 
take these issues, and issues of intersectionality in general, into account when 
discussing sexual assault. 
In Danielle L. McGuire’s article, “‘It Was like All of Us Had Been Raped’: Sexual 
Violence, Community Mobilization, and the African American Freedom Struggle,” 
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she addresses how racism and sexism can combine when addressing cases of sexual 
assault involving black women. McGuire discusses the lack of any references to 
sexualized violence in the history of the African American freedom struggle through 
the frame of the rape of Betty Jean Owens, a black woman, by four white men, and 
the subsequent movements surrounding that case. McGuire asserts that through 
speaking out regarding the sexual violence that had been committed on them, black 
women were refusing to submit to a society that still favored white supremacy; 
while, at the same time, empowered black men by giving them an opportunity to 
assert themselves as men by “rallying around the protection of black womanhood” 
(McGuire, 2004). She discusses how the movement surrounding the Owens case 
became centered around this concept of protection, as the dominant societal 
thought was that “white women’s bodies were off limits, while black women’s 
bodies were fair game” (McGuire, 2004). The concept of protection moved into the 
politics of respectability (she refers to Rosa Parks becoming the icon of the bus 
boycott because she was a respectable, older, Christian woman; Owens was 
portrayed in much the same way, as a woman worthy of protection). These “politics 
of respectability” were also present in Jacquet’s analysis of the Giles-Johnson case, 
but in that case, the survivor’s lack of “respectability” worked against her, as was 
also the case in an instance on the University of Oregon campus that I will analyze in 
a later section. As a whole, however, the Owens case pitted white people and black 
people against each other, demonstrating that rape is in fact a racial issue.  
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Clearly, sexual assault is a complex political issue, with large amounts of 
intersectionality between different identities and prejudices. Jacquet discusses how 
societal responses to sexual assault can disenfranchise women and black men by 
having them work towards conflicting interests, and McGuire addresses how 
societal responses to sexual assault can widen the racial divide between white 
people and people of color. However, responses to sexual assault are not entirely 
polarizing. Maria Bevacqua’s article “Reconsidering Violence against Women: 
Coalition Politics in the Antirape Movement,” is primarily discussing how disparate 
branches of the women’s movement were able to actually become more unified 
because of the issue of rape. The women’s movement was traditionally divided 
between liberal feminists, who believed in reforming society to better reflect the 
needs of women, and radical feminists, who eschewed any sort of male-dominated 
society and believed reform was not a strong enough solution. The movement was 
further divided into white feminists and feminists of color, who often felt that the 
dominant white woman’s agenda did not serve their interests. However, rape and 
sexual assault was an issue that bridged these traditional gaps. The antirape 
movement emerged as part of second-wave feminism, originally from radical 
feminists (in keeping with the image of a radical feminist who isn’t afraid to go 
beyond the image of women as “respectable,” i.e. nonsexual beings who never 
address issues of sex). Radical feminists initiated the self-defense movement and 
establishment of rape crisis centers and hotlines, again keeping to the traditional 
conception of radical feminists as those who do not seek to reform the current 
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institutions, but rather to create institutions of their own. Liberal feminists began 
advocating for change in current institutions, i.e. to create stronger penalties for 
convicted rapists and revise policies for how police officers were to treat survivors 
when they reported. Bevacqua argues that the two groups were able to find a 
common ground because of the timeliness of the issue as well; the antirape 
movement began at a point when liberal feminists were beginning to adopt some of 
the women’s liberation movement’s irreverence, while radical feminists were 
starting to focus more on single-issue organizing. The two groups united with a 
common goal in mind: “to abolish rape in our own lifetimes” (Bevacqua, 2008). 
 Similarly, black and white feminists were able to come together regarding 
the issue of rape. The Washington, D.C. Rape Crisis Center (RCC) had documented 
involvement of both black and white feminist activists from its inception. Black 
feminists and white feminists were unified on the issue of rape primarily because 
white women were willing to recognize that rape is the result of “the combined 
oppressions of racism, sexism, poverty, and imperialism” – thus acknowledging the 
intersectionality inherent in the act (Bevacqua, 2008). This could be conceived as a 
historical “best practice,” something that college and university campuses should 
consider when revising sexual assault policies and procedures. Bevacqua’s final 
argument, that this unification of previously disparate groups aided the antirape 
movement as a whole, reinforces the point that future antirape movements, 
including those on college campuses, should look to the causes of this success when 
considering any sort of antirape work. 
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However, this unification of disparate groups has struggled in the 
contemporary anti-rape era. Estelle B. Freedman’s Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence 
in the Era of Suffrage and Segregation can act as a bridge between a discussion of the 
historical framework of sexual assault in the United States and a more 
contemporary analysis of current sexual assault issues on college and university 
campuses. Redefining Rape is an analysis of the differences between various sects of 
anti-rape activists. Freedman discusses how, prior to the women’s movement, 
American political attitudes towards rape were primarily centered around the issue 
of race. But, in the wake of the women’s movement, anti-rape activism has been 
seeking a new lens through which to view the issue. Freedman argues that the 
redefinition of rape in America is a struggling movement in the present day because 
it consists of “disparate social critics” who cannot unify (Freedman, 2013). She 
touches on the history of such “disparate social critics,” such as white supremacists 
and feminists, unusual bedfellows who united in the effort against rape, but for 
different reasons (white supremacists wanted to perpetuate the myth of the “black 
beast rapist” in the name of racial inequality, feminists wanted actual black rapists 
to be brought to justice) (Freedman, 2013). The one thing these varied groups had 
in common was their use of rape and the tensions surrounding it to advance a 
political agenda.  
 Freedman further analyzes the use of rape as a political tool through 
referencing historical cultural changes that have affected attitudes towards rape, 
such as the racial justice movement and the growing influence of sexual liberalism 
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causing legal discourse on rape in the 50’s and 60’s to be centered around the 
protection of accused men (Freedman, 2013).  She also touches on seeming 
paradoxes that arise in a discussion of rape, for example, maintaining the privacy of 
defendants vs. perpetuating the social stigma attached to rape, the concept of date 
rape that may create an image of women as passive people unable to take care of 
themselves, the age of consent protecting younger women but also taking away 
their sexual agency, etc (Freedman, 2013). Freedman’s work is attempting to create 
a greater understanding of the complexity of the issue of sexual assault, and the 
intersecting factors that affect society’s view of both those accused and those 
accusing, as well as actual perpetrators and survivors. All of these issues are factors 
that must be taken into consideration when addressing sexual assault; therefore any 
analysis of a response to sexual assault on a college or university campus must 
include an evaluation of how well the institution takes these issues of 
intersectionality into account.  
 Clearly, sexual assault is a multilayered issue. Historically, the legal system in 
the United States has not been able to adequately navigate the conflicting factors 
that come into play when a sexual assault case is brought forward. This situation has 
resulted in the disenfranchisement of black men and of women as a whole, but 
particularly women of color. With such a complicated historical discourse regarding 
sexual assault in the United States, it is to be expected that colleges and universities, 
as microcosms of society, will struggle with navigating the correct path when it 
comes to addressing and responding to cases of sexual assault. It could be argued, in 
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fact, that there is no one “correct path” that serves all populations equally, as every 
population has differing needs. However, an analysis of the recent media outcry 
against institutions of higher education and their sexual assault procedures (or lack 
thereof) will demonstrate that whatever colleges and universities are currently 
















CAMPUS RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN ANALYSIS                 18             
Contemporary Attitudes Towards Sexual Assault on College and 
University Campuses 
 As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, attitudes towards sexual 
assault on college campuses have recently shifted to outrage over the lack of 
prevention efforts, as well as survivor resources, on college and university 
campuses across the nation. So much attention has focused on this issue that it has 
been deemed somewhat of an “epidemic,” and steps have been taken on both the 
federal and local level to address the “college sexual assault crisis.” This section will 
analyze the recent attention to the issue and the beginnings of the political 
responses, as well as whether or not such responses are taking into account the 
factors of intersectionality that the historical context surround sexual assault in the 
United States has made so relevant. 
 The scope of responses to the national realization that colleges and 
universities are not providing adequate support to survivors of sexual assault on 
campus can be broken down into four different categories: grassroots student 
responses, media coverage of grassroots student responses, the federal response to 
media coverage of grassroots student response, and university responses to the 
federal response to media coverage of grassroots student response. I will provide 
examples of each, as well as an analysis of what such a example means in the overall 
contemporary dialogue surrounding sexual assault.  
 Before delving into this discussion, however, I find it necessary to provide an 
analysis of an article by Salamishah Tillet referenced earlier, “Rape and Campus 
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Rape: Equal Under the Law?” Tillet refers to several timely articles/documents 
relating to the current sexual assault responsiveness improvement movement on 
college campuses, including the Campus Accountability and Safety Act, the Survivor 
Outreach and Support Campus Act, the “yes means yes” legislation in California, and 
Time magazine’s article “The Sexual Assault Crisis on American Campuses.” 
However, the main point of Tillet’s article is that, while grassroots 
movements/media coverage/federal response/university responses are all 
beneficial in the sense that some effort is being made to solve a problem that 
institutions had previously ignored, college campus prevention and responsiveness 
efforts are still not addressing the entirety of the sexual assault problem. She argues 
that “current prevention rhetoric assumes a universal hook-up culture that many 
students do not engage in, and policy proposals assume a color-blind, one-size-fits-
all approach to the crisis” (Tillet, 2014). Seeing as this is the overall trend regarding 
sexual assault on college campuses, it’s important to assess whether or not 
grassroots, media, federal, or university responses are taking this analysis into 
account. Tillet specifically discusses the racial tensions present in sexual assaults on 
college campuses, and how black women are in a “double bind,” in which they are 
forced to choose between their race and their gender when dealing with a sexual 
assault (Tillet, 2014). It is important to keep these ideas of intersectionality in mind 
when analyzing contemporary responses, and this paper will demonstrate that 
grassroots efforts are more likely to address these issues than local or national 
media, or local or federal government response. Finally, these issues will again 
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become important later in the paper when evaluating college campus best and 
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Grassroots Student Response to “College Sexual Assault Crisis” 
 A clear choice for an example of a grassroots, student-initiated movement to 
reform sexual assault responses on college and university campuses was the work 
of SAFER, or Students Active for Ending Rape. SAFER was initiated years before the 
recent media backlash to inadequate university policies and procedures, as it was 
founded in 2000 by Columbia University students (recall that Columbia University 
was also the site for the first “Collective Carry” mattress protest by Emme 
Sulkowicz) (SAFER, 2015). SAFER’s “About Us” describes the group as “the only 
organization that fights sexual violence and rape culture by empowering student-led 
campaigns to reform college sexual assault policies” (SAFER About Us, 2015). SAFER 
provides students with an online library of “organizing resources for stronger 
sexual assault policies, including an into to sexual assault activism, policy analysis, 
and how to be a better organizer” with over forty different articles available to 
students (SAFER Activist Resources Center, 2015), as well as bookable trainings to 
“facilitate campus-wide dialogue” (SAFER, 2015). Additionally, students can use the 
Campus Sexual Assault Policy Database to look up their own university’s policies 
and procedures, as well as submit an analysis of their school through the “student 
friendly, step-by-step process, the Campus Accountability Project” if their school has 
not already been evaluated (SAFER, 2015). SAFER has risen to national prominence, 
with Cosmopolitan, The Washington Post, MSNBC’s The Last Word, The Huffington 
Post, and USA Today featuring aspects of the organization. Additionally, SAFER’s 
Campus Accountability Project findings were cited in new stories from The 
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Associated Press covering President Barack Obama’s new initiative to combat college 
sexual assault rates, It’s On Us. 
  It’s clear that SAFER has had a significant impact on revising college sexual 
assault policies and procedures, as well as raising awareness of the issue as a whole. 
In a deeper analysis of the organization as a whole, it also soon becomes apparent 
that SAFER has taken the time to address the issues of intersectionality of race, 
gender, and sexual assault brought up through the historical framework of rape in 
the United States. SAFER’s “About Us” section states that “SAFER firmly believes that 
sexual violence is both influenced by and contributes to multiple forms of 
oppression, including racism, sexism, and homo/transphobia, and view our anti-
sexual violence work through a broader anti-oppression lens” (SAFER About Us, 
2015). SAFER supports this commitment to addressing intersectionality through the 
inclusion of an entire section devoted to “Intersectionality: What it is, Why it is 
Essential” in their Activist Resource Center, detailing how “social injustice can easily 
permeate organizing tactis and alienate current and potential members [of antirape 
activist groups],” as well as how “social injustice distinctly affects rape – e.g. victim 
reporting and offender allegations, treatment by university authorities and legal 
authorities, families, communities” (SAFER Intersectionality: What it is, Why it is 
Essential, 2015). SAFER follows this discussion with lists regarding “How to be a 
Good Ally,” “How to be a Good Educator,” and “How to Initiate Dialogue” (SAFER 
Intersectionality: What it is, Why it is Essential, 2015). This theme of addressing 
intersectionality is woven through all of SAFER’s efforts, meaning the organization 
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and its resulting activism on college campuses ensures their antirape activism 
confronts the racism and sexism inherent in sexual assault, making SAFER’s 
campaigns serve all university students, regardless of identity. This intersectional 
approach could be interpreted as a kind of best practice, and will be referenced 
again with assessing actual university best practices, which may not place such a 
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Media Response to Grassroots Student Response to “College Sexual Assault 
Crisis” 
For an example of a mainstream media response to the grassroots student 
response to inadequate sexual assault procedures on college and university 
campuses, I will analyze an article from a major national news outlet, CNN.com. 
Emanuella Grinberg’s “Ending rape on campus: activism takes several forms” details 
how a “student-led activists movement fights to end rape on campus” (Grinberg, 
2014). The article describes four instances of students initiating activism on 
university campuses: Sarah O’Brien of Vanderbilt University, John Kelly of Tufts 
University, Sofie Karasek of the University of California, Berkeley, and Anusha Ravi 
of Emory University, as well as one professor, Caroline Heldman of Occidental 
College.  
O’Brien, a student athlete, was acquaintance-raped in 2010. When Vanderbilt 
dismissed her resulting PTSD as it was more related to “the stress of being a student 
athlete” than to her sexual assault (Grinberg, 2014), she launched an activist 
campaign including a Take Back the Night event, working with the activist groups 
Know Your IX to file a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education against 
Vanderbilt, and an eventual mass collaboration with the Vanderbilt Students of 
Nonviolence group to deliver an 11-page list of demands including “a single office 
focused on sexual assault prevention and treatment; a website that pulls together all 
campus resources and protections afforded under Title IX; posters around campus 
discouraging sexual violence; inclusion of students on boards related to campus life 
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and sexual assault policies; and more training in sexual assault prevention for 
people on those committees” (Grinberg, 2014).  
Kelly, a gay male student at Tufts University, initiated student activism on his 
campus after his university suspended, rather than expelled, his attacker due the 
university’s definition of rape not including oral sex. Kelly ran for student senate 
and eventually combined two campus groups, Action for Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Consent Culture Network, to write a letter to the Tufts University 
administration advocating for eight major policy changes (Grinberg, 2014). After 
Tufts University convened a Task Force on Sexual MisConduct Prevention (similar 
to two other task forces evaluated later in this paper), Kelly shifted his attention to 
the national stage, working with Ed Act Now and eventually becoming a member of 
the Department of Education’s Negotiated Rulemaking Committee on the Violence 
Against Women Act (Grinberg, 2014).  
Karasek was sexually assaulted in 2011 at an off-campus event by an 
individual who would later assault three other University of California, Berkeley 
students. When the school’s response was to work only with her attacker through 
an “early resolution process,” resulting in the attacker’s early graduation, Karasek 
worked with eight other students to file a Clery complaint against UC Berkeley, 
along with a press release and press conference. This resulted in her testifying at a 
joint legislative committee hearing, which subsequently resulted in a state-ordered 
audit of four University of California schools (Grinberg, 2014).  (Now, four years 
later, the work of the University of California, Berkeley’s President’s Task Force on 
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Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault has improved the 
administrative response to sexual assault enough for the university to be included in 
the “Best Practices” section of this paper.) 
Ravi, the only student interviewed who had not personally experienced an 
instance of sexual assault, became a student activist at Emory University because 
she feels “how a school deals with sexual assault is a reflection of the entire campus 
community – and it’s everyone’s job” (Grinberg, 2014). Although she doesn’t believe 
that Emory University has mishandled sexual assault cases in the way other colleges 
and universities have, she joined the student group Sexual Assault Peer Advocates to 
ensure the university administration continued to have a high standard of 
accountability when addressing issue of sexual assault on campus. Due to the efforts 
of the Sexual Assault Peer Advocates, Emory University now has not just one 
university-wide Title IX coordinator, but specific Title IX coordinators for every 
academic college.  
Heldman, an Associate Professor of Politics at Occidental College with a 
working-class background, became involved with antirape activism on her campus 
because of her experiences of growing up in a low-income, rural household, and 
how they have shaped her conception of “the fact that we don’t live in a meritorious 
society and some people are more likely to experience pain and suffering than 
others” (Grinberg, 2014). She argues that tenured professors have a responsibility 
to advocate for student’s rights on issues of sexual assault, as they are “the only ones 
at institutions who have power to speak out when administrations mistreat 
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students” (Grinberg, 2014). Helman helped 37 students file a Title IX complaint 
against Occidental College in 2013 and currently serves as the faculty advisor to the 
student group End Rape on Campus. 
Grinberg’s choice to focus on five very different university individuals in 
“Ending rape on campus: Activism takes several forms” is a clear indication of how 
diverse and far-ranging an issue sexual assault on college and university campuses 
can be. Sexual assault can impact white, middle-class female students such as 
Karasek, but it can also impact student athletes such as O’Brien, gay male students 
such as Kelly, students of color (and students who have not personally been sexually 
assaulted) such as Ravi, and even university professors (and individuals from 
working-class families) such as Heldman. Grinberg’s article demonstrates a need for 
a flexible, adaptive university policy regarding sexual assault in order to 
accommodate the needs of diverse populations, as has also been indicated in the 
historical framework surrounding sexual assault, Tillet’s contemporary analysis, 
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Federal Response to Media Coverage of Grassroots Student Response to 
“College Sexual Assault Crisis” 
To analyze the response on the national, political stage, I will first discuss an 
overview of the Campus Accountability and Safety Act, as covered in Mary Beth 
Marklien’s article, “Bill aims to crack down on campus sexual assault,” as an example 
of a federal legislative response to the recent media focus on sexual assault on 
college and university campuses. I will then give a summary of “It’s On Us,” the 
White House’s campaign to increase awareness and reduce prevalence of sexual 
assault on college and university campuses, as an example of a federal executive 
response by the President of the United States.  
S. 2692 – Campus Accountability and Safety Act, was introduced in the U.S. 
Senate the week of July 30th, 2014, and enacts numerous changes to federal law 
addressing how colleges and universities need to respond to sexual assault on 
campus. It requires colleges to conduct annual anonymous surveys about student 
experiences with sexual assault, which need to be published online so prospective 
students and their parents can access it (Marklien, 2014). The bill also toughens 
sanctions against colleges that fail to report sexual assault crimes, raising the fine 
from $35,000 to $150,000, or 1% of the university’s total revenue. The bill was 
deemed necessary after a federal survey of 236 colleges and universities found that 
41% had conducted no investigations regarding sexual assault, regardless of 
whether or not there was a reported sexual assault crime on campus at the time 
(Marklien, 2014). Further changes under this act, if passed, would require colleges 
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and universities to designate advisors who coordinate survivor services, not allow 
athletic departments or other subgroups on campus to handle complaints of sexual 
violence for members of that group, and coordinate efforts with local law agencies 
(Marklien, 2014). The bill is currently still in committee. 
“It’s On Us,” launched on Friday, September 24th, 2014 is intended to be a 
“rallying cry, inviting everyone to step up and realize that the solution [to sexual 
assault on college and university campuses] begins with us” (Lierman, 2014). In 
President Obama’s launch address, he declared, “to the survivors who are leading 
the fight against sexual assault on campuses, your efforts have helped start a 
movement. I can only imagine how long and lonely your fight must feel. And that’s 
why we’re all here today – to say that it’s not on you; it’s not your fight to wage 
alone; it’s on us – all of us – to fight campus sexual assault. You are not alone. We’ve 
got your back” (Lierman, 2014). While the U.S. Congress is attempting actual policy 
change regarding sexual assault on college and university campuses, the White 
House and President Barack Obama are advocating for a nationwide culture change 
on the grassroots level. 
In the five days following the launch of “It’s On Us” the campaign was 
endorsed by several US Senators as well as the commissioners of the Athletic 10 and 
PAC-12 college athletic conferences and the NCAA as a whole entity. Several other 
prominent endorsements included the National Campus Leadership Council 
Executive Director Andy MacCracken, the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network 
President and Founder Scott Berkowitz, the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence 
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President Monika Johnson Hostler, and upper-level university administration at 
George Washington University, Michigan State University, Rutgers University, and 
Stanford University (Lierman, 2014). Also within the first five days of campaign 
activity, the campaign had 233 campuses pledge to host “It’s On Us” awareness 
events. Presently, over 250 colleges and universities have held such events or 
enacted “It’s On Us” style campaigns on campus (Castillo et al., 2015), including the 
University of Nevada, Reno, a fact which I will discuss further in the conclusion 
section. 
Both the Senate bill and the White House’s “It’s On Us” campaign 
demonstrate the importance of the issue of sexual assault on college and university 
campuses. The national attention on this issue has grown to the point of eliciting a 
federal response on both a legislative and a more “grassroots” level, with effective 









CAMPUS RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN ANALYSIS                 31             
University Responses to Federal Response to Media Coverage of Grassroots 
Student Response to “College Sexual Assault Crisis” 
Finally, as an overarching example of a list of university responses to federal 
response to media coverage of the grassroots student response to inadequate sexual 
assault procedures on college and university campuses, I turned to Tara Culp-
Ressler’s article “The College Sexual Assault Crisis Turns a Corner.” This article is 
analyzing the shift in national consciousness regarding sexual assault on college 
campuses. It refers to several incendiary cases that brought the issue into the 
national spotlight: American University, where leaked emails from an unrecognized 
fraternity contained casual conversations regarding its members engaging in date 
rape and physical assault of women; Brown University, where a student found guilty 
of raping and strangling another student was given only a one semester suspension; 
Columbia University (always in the national discourse on this topic), where a group 
of 23 students filed a federal complaint accusing university administrators of 
discouraging victims from reporting, giving out too lenient punishments to rapists, 
and not responding to the needs of LGBTQ students regarding the issue; and Tufts 
University, currently in danger of losing federal funding completely for failing to 
comply with Title IX provisions addressing sexual assault (Culp-Ressler, 2014). The 
article further discusses ways universities are proactively enacting changes, such as 
Dartmouth College and Cornell University revamping their policies and procedures 
to create a sexual assault prevention center and a bystander intervention program. 
However, the article implies that these changes may have been enacted for the 
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wrong reasons: after numerous student protests and petition drives regarding the 
issue, applications to Dartmouth University dropped 14% (Culp-Ressler, 2014). 
Similarly, Congress is pushing the U.S. News & World Report (referred to as the 
“Bible” of universities) to update its college rankings to include data about how a 
school is addressing sexual assault. The article as a whole questions if universities 
are “paying lip service to the issue of sexual assault reform without actually making 
any substantive changes” (Culp-Ressler, 2014). 
Culp-Ressler raises thought-provoking points regarding the motives behind 
university policy and procedure reform. These questionable motives should be kept 
in mind when analyzing best and worst practices on college and university 
campuses; if an institution is enacting reform simply to ensure continued successful 
student recruitment, it is very likely that such an institution’s reformed policies are 
not addressing the multilayered complexities surrounding sexual assault that the 
historical framework raised, that Tillet highlights, and that SAFER works to address.  
 
Clearly, the issue of campus sexual assault is one that affects all members of 
society, and is important on the university, local, and national levels. In the next 
sections, I will move into a discussion of actual policies and procedures in place on 
college campuses, starting with those that have been deemed ineffective and likely 
contributed to this national outcry, and moving into those that have been more 
successful in catering to the needs of students as a whole as well as student 
survivors.  
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Evaluation of “Worst Practices” on College Campuses  
Overview 
 Throughout both the historical framework and contemporary response 
sections, I have demonstrated that sexual assault is a multifaceted issue that has 
long been inadequately addressed by our society as a whole, but specifically college 
and university campuses. Local grassroots activism, federal legislation, a nationwide 
campaign, and endless media attention have made sexual assault on college and 
university campuses a hot-button issue. Because of this heightened scrutiny, it has 
become abundantly clear when a college or university is not adequately serving its 
student population in terms of sexual assault responsiveness. For the purposes of 
my research, I chose to focus on sexual assault response policies and procedures on 
large, public, Research I universities. When discussing “worst practices” in regard to 
these policies and procedures, two large, public, Research I universities stand out 
for their gross mishandling of extremely public sexual assault cases: Florida State 
University and the University of Oregon. 
 Both of the cases I will analyze involve instances of student-athletes being 
accused of perpetrating sexual assault on non student-athletes. It is beyond the 
scope of this research to discuss the dynamics that come into play in athletic 
programs at universities that place particular value on national athletic prominence. 
Both Florida State University and the University of Oregon can be defined as 
overvaluing athletics; in a 2010 study, universities in the Atlantic Coast Conference, 
Florida State University’s athletic conference, had a median spending rate of 
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$103,384 on a student-athlete’s success, and a median spending rate of $15,360 on a 
non student-athlete’s success (Desrochers, 2010). Similarly, universities in the 
Pacific-10 conference (now the Pacific-12 conference), the University of Oregon’s 
athletic conference, had a median spending rate of $102,121 on a student-athlete 
success, and a median spending rate of $14, 217 on a non student-athlete’s success 
(Desrochers, 2010). The impact of such an athlete-focused campus culture is 
undeniably playing a role in the sexual assault cases I will be analyzing at both 
Florida State University and the University of Oregon, possibly both privileging and 
disenfranchising the athletic students in question. However, as athletic privilege is 
not the focus of this paper, but rather university policies and procedures, I will not 
be delving too deeply into the role athletics may play in these cases.  
 However, given the extensive discussion in both the historical framework as 
well as the contemporary analysis of the role race may play in sexual assault on 
college campuses, it is well within the scope of this research to assess the dynamics 
that may have come into play regarding race in both of these cases. The accused 
perpetrator in the Florida State University case, Jameis Winston, was a black male 
student, accused of sexual assault by Erica Kinsman, a white female student. The 
accused perpetrators in the University of Oregon case, Dominic Artis, Brandon 
Austin, and Damyean Dotson, were all black male students accused of sexual assault 
by a female student (the race of the female student cannot be determined as she 
remains anonymous). To discuss these cases without acknowledging the racial 
dynamics inherent in such situations would be an inadequate analysis of the 
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situation; therefore, an analysis of the intersectionality of race and sexual assault in 
these cases will accompany the discussion of administrative actions taken or not 
taken, as well as student and media responses to these actions or lack thereof.  
 A final note before I move into my discussion of these specific cases: it is not 
the purpose of this paper to determine whether or not the accused in these sexual 
assault cases are guilty. An assessment of the lack of administrative action against 
these individuals on the part of their universities may at times seem as if this paper 
is arguing on behalf of the accusers; this is not the case. I am attempting to 
demonstrate that whether or not the accused are guilty of sexual assault, the 
university response in both instances was inadequate and did a disservice to all 
students involved. If the accused did commit sexual assault, a university’s lack of 
appropriate administrative action meant more suffering and disenfranchisement for 
the accuser, and if the accused did not commit sexual assault, lack of university 
action meant widespread doubt and judgment regarding the accused that may have 
been dismissed through a proper sexual assault investigation. I am arguing that such 
inadequate policies and procedures hurt both accusers and accused, not that either 
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Florida State University 
 On December 7th, 2012, Erica Kinsman, then a first-year student at Florida 
State University, reported that she had been raped off-campus by Jameis Winston, 
also a first-year student at the time and redshirt quarterback of Florida State 
University’s football team, which would go on to win the Atlantic Coast Conference 
championship and the Bowl Championship Series Orange Bowl on January 1st, 2013, 
32 days after Winston’s encounter with Kinsman (Bogdanich, 2014). The Florida 
State Athletics Department was notified of the charges in January 2013, but the 
university did not pursue any sort of administrative action against Winston until 
January 2014, after the football season of that year had concluded (and after 
Winston and the rest of the FSU Seminoles had won their third national 
championship) (Bogdanich, 2014).  It is also worth noting that, in November 2013, 
the first media coverage of the Winston case, an article entitled, “Florida State QB 
Jameis Winston Investigated for Sexual Assault,” was published by TMZ.com and 
immediately picked up by the Tampa Bay Times, who made the first media request 
for the police records regarding the case (Florida State QB, 2013, Bogdanich, 2014). 
Prior to November 2013, the media had been unaware of any encounter between 
Kinsman and Winston, meaning no individuals outside of the case were aware that 
eleven months and almost two football seasons had elapsed without the university 
enacting any sort of investigation.   
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 An article in the New York Times points out several inconsistencies and gross 
oversights on the part of the university and Tallahassee/FSU police when 
addressing the Winston-Kinsman case: 
 Video footage of the sexual encounter was taken by Winston’s friend and 
fellow football teammate, Chris Casher. Winston, Casher, and another 
teammate who was also present during the encounter between Winston and 
Kinsman, Ronald Darby, all openly admitted to being aware Casher was 
recording everything without Kinsman’s knowledge. This kind of behavior is 
an express violation of FSU’s Student Conduct Code, made widely available 
through the Florida State University Office of Student Rights and 
Responsibilities (Student Rights and Responsibilities, 2012). Although 
Casher’s admission to recording the encounter was never concealed from 
Florida State University nor any police entities, the Times reports that Rachel 
Bukanc, an FSU assistant dean who oversees student conduct issues, “said 
she knew of no student who had secretly videotaped sex” (Bogdanich, 2014). 
It was only after the Times raised this question, therefore making the 
university aware that outside entities were aware of Casher’s video, that 
Florida State University immediately charged Casher and Darby in 
connection with the covert video recording.  
 The police investigator for the case, Scott Angulo, has been quoted as telling 
Patricia A. Carroll, Kinsman’s lawyer, that “because Tallahassee [is] a big 
football town, [your client will] be raked over the coals if she [pursues] the 
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case” (Bogdanich, 2014). Angulo’s initial report regarding the case states 
that, “this case is being suspended at this time [February 2013] due to a lack 
of cooperation from the victim. If the victim decides to press charges, the 
case will be pursued” (Bogdanich, 2014). However, a statement from Carroll 
insists that “the officer never informed her client that he had suspended his 
investigation, and her client never said she would not cooperate. She said 
that while her client was indeed concerned about the prospect of pressing 
her case against a star-in-waiting, ‘at no time did we call him and tell him we 
don’t want you to do an investigation.’ Her client, she added, simply wanted 
more information before deciding what to do” (Bogdanich, 2014).  
 Tallahassee police informed the FSU Athletics Department of the charge 
against Winston on January 23rd, 2013. In keeping with federal law, “any 
athletic department official who learns of possible sexual misconduct is 
required to pass it on to school administrators” (Bogdanich, 2014). However, 
no student conduct charges against Winston, Casher, or Darby were pressed, 
or even discussed, until November 2013, eleven months after the FSU 
Athletics Department was initially notified. Florida State University’s official 
statement reads, “In the case examined by The Times involving Jameis 
Winston, no university official received a report from any complainant 
naming Winston prior to when the allegations were made public in 
November 2013” (Florida State University Response to NYT Story, 2014). 
This means that either the FSU Athletics Department failed to fulfill their 
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duties in informing FSU administration of the charges leveled against 
Winston, or the university simply chose to ignore these charges until media 
attention made it impossible to do so.  
In another Florida State University statement, a timeline of the university’s 
response to the Kinsman-Winston case is detailed. The only referral to the Athletics 
Department neglecting to follow through on their federally mandated duty to notify 
university administration of the situation was as follows: “The Athletics Department 
also considered accounts by the athlete and two other FSU student athletes who 
were present at the encounter. All three independently described it as consensual. 
Based on that and the [Tallahassee Police Department’s] decision [to not pursue the 
case based on the inaccurate assumption that Kinsman did not wish to press 
charges], the Athletics Department did not file a report with the University's Title IX 
administrator or the Office of Student Rights and Responsibilities” (Florida State 
University An open letter, 2014). 
A further incident of sexual misconduct involving Winston occurred on 
September 24th, 2014. According to The Guardian (and corroborated by numerous 
Tweets by FSU students), Winston climbed atop a table at the Oglesby Student 
Union on the FSU campus and repeatedly screamed, “Fuck her right in the pussy!” 
(Glenza, 2014). Although this incident was ostensibly unrelated to the situation with 
Kinsman, a later lawsuit filed by Kinsman argues that “FSU’s tolerance of Winston’s 
obscene rants insulting women and the resulting wrist-slap sanction he received 
[Winston was suspended for one game due to his behavior] are but a small part of 
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the sexually hostile environment that [Kinsman] endured” (United States District 
Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).  
Kinsman’s lawsuit, Jane Doe v. Florida State University (later changed to Erica 
Kinsman v. The Florida State University Board of Trustees after Kinsman decided that 
it was no longer necessary to conceal her identity), was filed on January 7th, 2015. 
The suit clarifies further specific actions FSU failed to take regarding the Kinsman-
Winston case:  
 “On January 22, 2013, the FSU Athletics Department was in contact with the 
Tallahassee Police and learned that Winston had been identified as the 
suspect in a violent sexual assault. The FSU Athletics Department called 
meetings involving high-ranking FSU Athletics Department and football 
officials, Winston, and Winston’s lawyer. On information and belief, head 
football coach James “Jimbo” Fisher (“Fisher”) and Senior Associate Athletics 
Director Frances “Monk” Bonasorte (“Bonasorte”) became aware of the rape 
accusations against Winston at that time. The FSU Athletics Department 
chose to violate school policy and not report to the FSU administration that 
their star recruit had been identified as the suspect in the December 7, 2012 
rape investigation. This deliberate concealment of student-on-student sexual 
harassment to protect the football program deprived Plaintiff of her rights 
under Title IX” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida 
Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015). 
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 “For the next eleven months, FSU did nothing to investigate Plaintiff’s report 
of rape while the FSU Athletics Department continued to keep the incident a 
secret. Despite Plaintiff’s report to the FSU Police and the FSU Athletics 
Department’s knowledge of the suspect’s identity, no one at FSU conducted 
any investigation into the matter. Winston, meanwhile, was named starting 
quarterback of the football team and, in the fall of 2013, led FSU in the 
pursuit of a national championship” (United States District Court Middle 
District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).   
 “Plaintiff scheduled a meeting for January 17, 2013 with Kori Pruett 
(“Pruett”), the FSU Victim Advocate who was assigned to provide emotional 
and academic support to Plaintiff in the wake of her sexual assault. The 
purpose of the January 17, 2013 meeting was to discuss what to do now that 
Plaintiff had identified her perpetrator as a football player at FSU who was in 
one of her classes. Plaintiff and Pruett talked about whether Plaintiff should 
withdraw from FSU for the semester and, if not, whether to drop the class – 
something Plaintiff was reluctant to do as it would have delayed her 
graduation. They discussed the criminal investigation of Winston and Pruett 
said that FSU had a disciplinary process through the Office of Student Rights 
and Responsibilities (“SRR”), but Pruett did not say whether the process 
would be employed. Plaintiff told Pruett she would see whether she could 
handle staying in school and whether Winston would continue to attend her 
race and ethnicity class. Nobody at FSU ever informed Plaintiff that Winston 
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could be required to drop the class or that any other accommodation or 
protection could be put in place to help her” (United States District Court 
Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).   
 “On February 7, 2013, three weeks after initially meeting with Pruett, 
Plaintiff and Pruett met again. Plaintiff said that, to her relief, Winston had 
not shown up in her race and ethnicity class since the mandatory first day of 
class on January 10, 2013, but that she was still terrified of seeing him again 
and had been struggling with some of her course work. She told Pruett that 
the police investigators were waiting for toxicology results. Again, nothing 
was offered by anyone at FSU to protect Plaintiff, ensure her safety or 
minimize her worries of running into her assailant. No one from FSU’s 
administration or Title IX office ever contacted Plaintiff during either the 
spring 2013 semester of Plaintiff’s freshman year or the fall 2013 semester of 
Plaintiff’s sophomore year regarding disciplinary proceedings, investigation 
of the rape, protection of Plaintiff from Winston, removing him from her 
courses, restraining his proximity to her, or possibly removing him from 
school altogether” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida 
Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015). 
 “FSU knew that its confidential Victim Advocate Program was not a 
substitute for its obligations under Title IX. FSU knew that it had duties to 
investigate, accommodate and protect sexual assault victims such as Plaintiff 
and to investigate and sanction those responsible in a manner that addressed 
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the harassment and prevented its recurrence” (United States District Court 
Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).   
 “Despite clear notice of FSU’s ongoing duties under Title IX, in August 2013, 
nine months after Plaintiff’s report to the police, Fisher named Winston FSU’s 
starting quarterback. At the time that Winston was named the starter, the 
FSU Athletics Department knew that they were committing gross violations 
of Title IX by hiding the report from the administration” (United States 
District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 
2015).   
  “On November 8, 2013, the Tallahassee Police received an inquiry from the 
Tampa Bay Times about a reported investigation into the now star 
quarterback. Tallahassee Police immediately notified FSU Police Chief David 
Perry (“Chief Perry”) about the inquiry and sent Chief Perry the police 
reports at Perry’s request. Chief Perry forwarded those police reports on to 
Bonasorte that same night and Bonasorte then notified Fisher. Shortly 
thereafter, Winston’s lawyer, R. Timothy Jansen (“Jansen”), also received a 
copy of those reports. When questioned about where he received a copy of 
the unreleased reports, Jansen said that ‘he got them from a guy in town’ 
who, on information and belief, was a member of the FSU Athletics 
Department” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando 
Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015). 
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 “Despite being on notice that [a student] had reported being raped by 
Winston, on November 12, 2013, FSU Dean of Students Jeanine Ward-Roof 
(“Ward-Roof”), who supervised Code of Conduct proceedings at FSU, emailed 
Chief Perry and others at FSU stating that no disciplinary proceedings against 
Winston were going to take place” (United States District Court Middle 
District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).   
 “In the wake of an ensuing media frenzy, Plaintiff was relentlessly vilified and 
threatened on the Internet and in FSU football-friendly quarters, and her and 
her family’s personal and work addresses were published on the Internet, 
along with false slurs on Plaintiff’s character and threats on her life.  Fearing 
for her safety, Plaintiff left FSU’s campus on November 14, 2013. Still, FSU 
made no investigation into its starting quarterback” (United States District 
Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 2015).   
 “Shortly after winning the 2014 BCS National Championship game, FSU 
inquired of Winston about the rape accusation for the first time. Winston 
refused to answer any questions and FSU again let the matter drop. 
Following months of persistence by Plaintiff, FSU finally conducted an 
investigation that consisted of interviewing Plaintiff and her parents and 
making another interview request to Winston, who again refused to answer 
any questions. No other witnesses were contacted. At the conclusion of this 
minimal and now compromised investigation, an FSU Code of Conduct 
hearing was finally held in December 2014, but the hearing officer found that 
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insufficient evidence existed, leaving Winston undisciplined” (United States 
District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, Erica Kinsman, 
2015).    
At the time of this paper’s writing, Florida State University has made a 
motion to dismiss Kinsman’s lawsuit (filed on March 9th, 2015). The motion is 
based on the fact that “the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando 
Division, Dispositive Motion, 2015). The motion further states that “Title IX 
officials at FSU learned of Kinsman’s alleged assault by Winston only days before 
the rest of the world, when the media broke the story of Kinsman’s allegations in 
2013,” which it argues does not constitute “deliberate indifference,” the 
terminology used to define a Title IX violation. However, the motion follows up 
on this point with the argument that “deliberate indifference ‘is an exacting 
standard’…deliberate indifference is therefore a high bar – negligence or gross 
negligence falls far short of it” (United States District Court Middle District of 
Florida Orlando Division, Dispositive Motion, 2015). By the motion’s own 
language, Florida State University has admitted to the possibility that university 
administration may have grossly neglected the needs of Erica Kinsman, but, 
using the argument that gross negligence is a lower standard than deliberate 
indifference, the university is claiming that Kinsman’s legal action has no 
ground.   
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The motion further argues that Florida State University was not responsible 
for the harassment Kinsman claimed to have experience as a result of Winston’s 
alleged sexual assault. On page 13, it is explicitly stated that, “Merely being on 
campus with Winston is not harassment under Title IX,” and that “Kinsman 
acknowledges in the Complaint that she chose to remain enrolled in the one 
class that she and Winston shared, and that she indeed kept going to class,” 
heavily implying that it was Kinsman’s responsibility to remove herself from any 
situation where she could have come into contact with Winston (parallels can be 
drawn between this situation and a similar “victim-blaming” attitude exhibited 
by Harvard University in the “Dear Harvard” case referenced in the introduction 
to this paper) (United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando 
Division, Dispositive Motion, 2015). 
Ironically enough, it is within documents attached as exhibits to FSU’s motion 
and intended to prove the university’s full compliance with Kinsman and with 
Title IX that the extent of the university’s refusal to cooperate with or make any 
sort of accommodations for Kinsman becomes clear. In response to Kinsman’s 
allegations, attorneys representing Florida State University told Kinsman’s 
lawyers that, before the university would file student conduct charges against 
either Casher or Darby (with no mention of any charges regarding Jameis 
Winston), they “would like to better understand your client’s position regarding 
her potential participation” and her “willingness to provide additional 
information or otherwise participate in” the complaint resolution process 
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(United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, 
Dispositive Motion, 2015). Kinsman’s lawyers responded with an argument that, 
“Ms. Kinsman is unable to attend classes or otherwise be on or near campus due 
to threats against her life and well-being. It would be especially unreasonable to 
expect her to appear in person on campus for interviews or a Code of Conduct 
hearing in light of these dangers…It is incumbent on the University to conduct 
proper investigations and hearings in ways that fully safeguard Ms. Kinsman. 
This can be accomplished without her coming to Tallahassee, however. For 
example, meetings and hearings can be held in other locations or telephonically, 
or by Skype or Google+” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida 
Orlando Division, Dispositive Motion, 2015). FSU’s attorney’s response was that 
“an in-person meeting is usually the most effective means of gathering 
information, and the University’s Title IX personnel would welcome such a 
meeting with Ms. Kinsman” (United States District Court Middle District of 
Florida Orlando Division, Dispositive Motion, 2015). The following is an excerpt 
from the final letter from Kinsman’s lawyers, asking why all communication thus 
far had focused on clarifying the situation with Casher and Darby, with no 
mention of Winston: “Please keep us posted on the progression of the 
disciplinary matters against Messrs. Casher and Darby…What is conspicuously 
missing though is disciplinary charges against Mr. Winston. It is now fifteen 
months since Ms. Kinsman provided a report to Florida State University about 
being raped. The identity of the offender is known to FSU and the school is aware 
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that the accused student is still under the control of and enrolled at Florida State 
University. Furthermore, my client has repeatedly expressed her willingness to 
cooperate with the University. Ms. Kinsman has provided detailed accounts of 
her assault to Florida State University Police Department, Tallahassee Police 
Department, and the State’s Attorney’s Office. She has also submitted to a sexual 
assault examination at Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. All of these records are 
readily available online and are no doubt already in your possession. You have 
recently provided a letter to us that indicated that, by contrast, the offender is 
refusing to cooperate with FSU’s investigation. If charges against Mr. Winston 
are forthcoming, please advise. If they are not, perhaps you can explain why that 
is” (United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando Division, 
Dispositive Motion, 2015). 
It should be reiterated that this motion was filed on behalf of the university 
itself, meaning the intent is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the institution 
did everything in its power to adequately serve Erica Kinsman according to her Title 
IX rights. Yet, after that final letter from Kinsman’s attorneys, there was no further 
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University of Oregon 
On March 14th, 2014, an anonymous female student at the University of 
Oregon filed a police report alleging three black male student basketball players at 
the University of Oregon, Brandon Austin, Damyean Dotson, and Dominic Artis, 
sexually assaulted her on the night of March 8th through the morning of March 9th, 
2014 (Reporting Officer Narrative, 2014). Then-president of the University of 
Oregon, Michael Gottfredson, was informed of the police report’s existence on 
March 17th, 2014, the day before the 2014 NCAA March Madness basketball 
tournament was scheduled to begin (University of Oregon Media Relations, 2014). 
The University of Oregon, at the time ranked 7th in the nation for basketball (the 
university has been ranked higher at only five points during its 113 years of having 
a basketball program), was scheduled to open the tournament the next day against 
Brigham Young University (2010-2011 Men’s Basketball Multi-Media Guide, 2010, 
March Madness 2014 Bracket, 2014).  
 The alleged sexual assault was described as extremely violent in the police 
report, with the female student stating that she was first vaginally and orally raped 
by Austin and Dotson at the same time in a bathroom at a party, and later physically 
forced into a cab with Austin, Dotson, and Artis (as well as physically forced to 
consume two large sips of a strong alcoholic drink while in the cab), taken to a 
residence, and repeatedly vaginally raped by Austin, Dotson, and Artis in turn while 
a fourth, unidentified man watched.  Additionally, the student stated in her report 
that Dotson later bragged to a group of people who came into the apartment, “about 
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what he and the guys did. He said, she was crying, maybe because we fucked her too 
hard” (Reporting Officer Narrative, 2014). She described numerous instances of all 
three men grabbing her by the hair, pinning her arms to her sides, and pulling her 
along by her neck, and at the time of filing the report, possessed numerous bruises, 
including multiple on her arms and neck (Reporting Officer Narrative, 2014).  
 Despite the violent nature of the alleged assault, and despite the fact that the 
Eugene Police Department was in the midst of an ongoing investigation, neither 
Gottfredson nor any other university administrator made any move to suspend the 
three male students. Dotson and Artis remained active and in good standing with 
both the basketball team and the university as a whole throughout the entire 
duration of the 2014 NCAA March Madness tournament (Austin, described in the 
report as  “the most physical,” and “the most forceful,” was ineligible to play for the 
University of Oregon regardless of the sexual assault charge, as he had recently 
transferred from another insitution) (Reporting Officer Narrative, 2014, University 
of Oregon Media Relations, 2014, Norlander, Three Oregon players, 2014).  
 Gottfredson stated that the police report was made available to other 
university officials, including members of the athletic department, on April 24th, 
2014, 32 days after the University of Oregon basketball team was defeated by the 
University of Wisconsin and eliminated from contention for the NCAA tournament 
title, and 17 days after the 2014 March Madness tournament had ended entirely 
(University of Oregon Media Relations, 2014, March Madness 2014 Bracket, 2014). 
However, neither Athletic Director Rob Mullens nor head basketball coach Dana 
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Altman chose to read the report until April 30th, 2014, six days after it was first 
made available to them (Parrish, 2014). Additionally, Altman has admitted that he 
“did not know of – nor seek to find – the nature of the case or who was involved in it 
on his team when he first learned of an investigation” (Norlander, Oregon releases 
timeline, 2014). The university has not, to this day, provided any sort of explanation 
as to why athletics officials both made no initial effort to learn more regarding the 
case, and delayed review of the police report until the end of April 2014, meaning no 
administrative action was taken against Austin, Dotson, or Artis until almost two 
months after the assault was initially reported. Additionally, the only administrative 
action initially taken against the three was to suspend them from the basketball 
team in May 2014, after the basketball season had ended. It wasn’t until the end of 
June 2014, nearly four months after the anonymous female student went to the 
police with her story, that all three students were dismissed from the institution 
(Norlander, Three Oregon players, 2014).  
 However, this was hardly the largest oversight the University of Oregon 
perpetuated against the anonymous female student. On Thursday, January 8th, 2015, 
the student filed a lawsuit, Jane Doe v. University of Oregon, Dana Dean Altman, as an 
individual alleging three key areas of gross misconduct: that the university delayed 
administrative action against Austin, Dotson, and Artis in order to further the 
basketball team’s success (as detailed earlier in this paper); that Altman recruited 
Brandon Austin to play at the University of Oregon with the full knowledge that 
Austin had been suspended from his previous institution, Providence College, due to 
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allegations that he’d sexually assaulted another student; and that the university had 
illegally accessed her campus counseling records in an attempt to discredit her 
(information regarding both later claims detailed below) (Cooper, 2015). The suit 
further alleged that the university first attempted to access her records when 
university administration received notice of her impending lawsuit, which was 
initially planned to include only the charges related to the delay of action against 
Austin, Dotson, and Artis, and Altman’s recruitment of Austin (Kingkade, University 
of Oregon Violated, 2015).  
 Brandon Austin was first accused of sexual assault at Providence College in 
Rhode Island on November 3rd, 2013, four months before the incident involving the 
anonymous female student at the University of Oregon. Unlike the University of 
Oregon, Austin and a teammate also named as a potential perpetrator, Rodney 
Bullock, were suspended from the basketball team three days after the assault 
charge was filed, and eventually suspended for the rest of the season (Smith, 2014). 
The investigation was still ongoing when Austin was recruited and enrolled at the 
University of Oregon (Auerbach, 2014). When asked at a news conference why 
Austin had been recruited while he was in the midst of a sexual assault 
investigation, Athletic Director Mullens stated that he was under the impression 
that “it was a student conduct matter and not a serious matter” (Auerbach, 2014). 
Altman initially attempted to claim that Austin had never informed him of the case. 
However when it became clear that Mullens knew of the case, therefore there would 
be no explanation for why Altman could not also be aware of the situation, he stated 
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that “my line of questioning probably didn’t go deep enough in retrospect” 
(Auerbach, 2014). When further pressed, he admitted that Oregon athletes are 
“required to go through a program to teach them about sexual violence,” but, seeing 
as the team usually goes through said program in their first year and Austin was a 
sophomore when he was recruited, Altman didn’t enforce the requirement that 
Austin attend the program (Auerbach, 2014).  
Regarding the student’s charges regarding illegal access of her medical records, 
Jennifer Morlok, a senior staff therapist at the University of Oregon’s counseling 
center, wrote a letter in February 2015 to university administration and the Justice 
Department detailing what she saw as a violation of the student’s confidentiality.  
Her concerns are outlined below: 
 “In my role as a Senior Staff Therapist at the UCTC, I have normally been 
supported to practice standard care for my clients (our students) with the 
freedom to follow all ethical guidelines; my constitutional rights as a 
clinician/employee who works for a State entity; and all State regulatory 
laws. However, things shifted when working with a student for whom 
litigation against the University was anticipated. I was told to provide non-
standard care for this student which went against my ethical and 
professional standards” (Morlok, 2015). 
 “When I tried to seek appropriate and unbiased information as of how to best 
respond clinically for the student, I was scolded and my job was threatened. 
My job was threatened for two reasons: 1) As the clinician, I wrote a letter of 
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summary for my client as per my client’s request/needs/therapeutic 
support/and standard care. 2) I sought unbiased legal counsel outside the UO 
due to my ethical/legal concerns in this case. I was informed ‘under no 
uncertain terms’ am I to seek ‘outside legal counsel’ – even though I was clear 
of my concern regarding the bias/conflict of interest present toward this 
client” (Morlok, 2015). 
 “My concern was confirmed when it came to my awareness that the client’s 
clinical records were accessed without the client’s permission or consent and 
without proper authorization prior to any litigation occurring. For this, I 
sought advice from the Oregon Board of Psychologist Examiners, who 
informed me of ORS 676.150, and my, ‘Duty to report prohibited or 
unprofessional conduct.’ I have done so according to this ORS statute and the 
requirements set before me as a licensed clinician in the state of Oregon” 
(Morlok, 2015).  
 “If the proper professional and ethical practices were followed, it actually 
would have reduced the university’s liability as a whole and everyone 
involved would have been better served” (Morlok, 2015).  
At the time of this paper’s writing, the University of Oregon has dropped its 
counterclaim lawsuit against the anonymous female student (Kingkade, 
University of Oregon Decides Not to Sue, 2015). A petition against the 
university’s lawsuit, declaring that “suing rape survivors will not make campus 
safer for the 1 in 5 women who will be sexually assaulted, harassed, or raped 
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each year on campus” accrued 2,322 supporters by February 2015, one month 
after the student filed her lawsuit and the university responded with its 
counterclaim (Stop suing rape survivors, 2015). Additionally, “12 faculty 
members, including five law professors, sent a letter to the UO administration 
objecting to the university's having accessed Doe's therapy records, which it did 
in December 2014. The school has insisted it acted legally in handling her 
records, but the professors said even if that was true, ‘that would not make this 
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Evaluation of “Best Practices” on College Campuses 
Overview 
 While the majority of media attention has, understandably, focused on 
colleges and universities that are not adequately responding to the needs of their 
students in terms of sexual assault prevention and survivor assistance, there are 
those universities that have recognized the problem and taken action to rectify the 
situation, to the best of their abilities. Two such universities that also fit the mold of 
large, public, Research I institutions are the University of California, Berkeley, and 
the University of Washington, both of which established a task force to assess sexual 
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University of California, Berkeley 
 The University of California, Berkeley, produced a 33-page “INITIAL REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT: President’s Task Force on Preventing and Responding to 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault,” discussing current efforts on college campuses 
in the University of California (UC) system and issuing several recommendations as 
to how these efforts could improve, in September 2014. It incorporated feedback 
from UC students, faculty, and staff, as well as other related entities including police 
services and crisis call centers (see Appendix A for a full list of task force 
participants). While the task force initially intended to provide the President of the 
UC system, Janet Napolitano, with “steps to improve the UC’s current processes that 
will make a difference in affecting cultural change in sexual violence and assault 
prevention” and “recommendations for implementing strategies to support 
excellence in prevention, response, and reporting of sexual violence, harassment, 
and sexual assault based on evidence-informed solutions and approaches” (Vacca et 
al., 2014), the body quickly determined that such ambitious goals were not feasibly 
able to be completed by the deadline of September 2014 (the task force convened in 
July 2014). Therefore, the task force broke its charge into two phases. Phase I would 
be “identifying initial recommendations” in time for the September 2014 deadline, 
and Phase II would be “further defining the detail for the recommendations to be 
implemented,” with a deadline for Phase II’s completion being set at July 2015 
(Vacca et al., 2014). Since Phase I is the only component of the report completed and 
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publicly available at this time, it is this section that I will be analyzing as an example 
of best practices by a large, public, Research I institution. 
 Although the report is intended to provide assessment and 
recommendations for the University of California system as a whole, a large 
component of the student, faculty, and administrative members were 
representatives of the University of California, Berkeley, as that institution is the 
flagship public university in the state of California, with 37, 581 students attending 
the large, public, Research I institution (University of California, Berkeley, 2015). UC 
Berkeley also has a history and national reputation as a progressive campus, both in 
institutional values and in its activist student culture (Friedman, 1997), making it an 
ideal campus to be the nexus for a prompt, state-wide response to the “sexual 
assault crisis” and the actions taken by the White House to combat sexual assault at 
colleges and universities.  
 The University of California’s “INITIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
President’s Task Force on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Violence and Sexual 
Assault” was published in September 2014 and ultimately issued seven key 
recommendations. The overall consensus was that “all [UC] locations should 
address the issues of sexual violence and sexual assault based on four key functions: 
Prevention, Education, Advocacy, and Response and Reporting. These four key 
functions (PEAR) are the foundation for the overarching model with its specific 
recommendations…to ensure that all students receive the best and most consistent 
services across the UC system” (Vacca et al., 2014). The seven recommendations the 
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task force concluded on, grouped into which aspect of the PEAR functions they 
address, are listed below (see Appendix A for a more detailed summary of these 
recommendations): 
 
Response and Reporting Recommendations 
Recommendation 1: Establish a Consistent “Response Team” Model at all Campuses 
Recommendation 2: Adopt Systemwide, Standard Investigation and Adjudication 
Standards 
Prevention/Education Recommendations 
Recommendation 3: Comprehensive Training and Education Plan  
Recommendation 4: Implement Comprehensive Communication Strategy to Educate 
the Community and Raise Awareness about UC Programs 
Prevention/Advocacy/Response Recommendations  
Recommendation 5: Establish an Independent Confidential Advocacy Office for 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault on Each Campus  
Recommendation 6: Establish a Comprehensive Systemwide Website with Campus 
Customization Capabilities  
Reporting Recommendation 
Recommendation 7: Systemwide Standard Data Collection  
(Vacca et al., 2014) 
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University of Washington 
The University of Washington (UW) produced a 29-page “Task Force on 
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Final Report: Goals and 
Recommendations,” in October 2013. The task force, originally charged to “make 
sure [the University of Washington] is doing all [it] can and should do to prevent 
sexual assault and to properly respond to every individual report of sexual assault” 
through an attempt to “review [the University of Washington’s] current policies and 
practices, explore best practices from other institutions, develop new practices to 
fill any gaps, and propose a plan for their implementation,” split this charge into two 
reports (Freccia et al., 2013). The first, an Initial Report, “outlined prevention and 
response resources, policies, and data regarding sexual assault at UW,” and was 
completed in May 2013 (Freccia et al., 2013). The second, the Final Report, builds on 
the research conducted in the Initial Report regarding the current UW climate 
around sexual assault by combining the information with student feedback and 
research on best practices at other institutions to ultimately outline eight Primary 
Goals and 18 recommendations arising from these goals. 
 The task force was comprised of UW faculty, staff, and students, both from 
the University of Washington flagship campus in Seattle, and from other UW 
campuses around the state (see Appendix C for a full list of task force participants). 
However, the majority of representation was from the University of Washington 
itself, a large, public, Research I institution with 44,786 students (University of 
Washington Office of Admissions, 2014).   
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 The eight overarching Primary Goals decided upon by the task force were 
described as implementing a “comprehensive, coordinated community approach” 
that is critical “for the UW – or any institution – to strive towards when creating a 
successful prevention and response program” (Freccia et al., 2013). They are as 
follows: 
 
1) Have a visible, robust, easily-accessible, collaborative network of response 
and intervention services for students in need. 
2) Educate all students about sexual assault. 
3) Create a community that knows how to respond and provide support. 
4) Provide an investigation and disciplinary process appropriate for sexual 
assault. 
5) Demonstrate compliance with all applicable federal and state laws, 
regulations, and guidance. 
6) Generate data, metrics, and reporting that allow for sound decision making 
7) Establish policies and procedures that set direction, clarify intent, and guide 
coordinated work 
8) Provide effective oversight and follow guiding principles to ensure common 
direction 
(Freccia et al., 2013) 
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Recognizing that these goals were broad and extremely ambitious, the task force 
subsequently decided upon 18 recommendations to aid in accomplishing the 
Primary Goals. These recommendations, grouped into which of the eight goals they 
apply to, are listed below (see Appendix D. for a full summary of these 
recommendations): 
 
Primary Goal 1: Have a Visible, Robust, Easily-Accessible, Collaborative 
Network of Response and Intervention Services for Students in Need. 
Recommendation 1: Develop Roles and Clarify Process Among Departments 
Providing Response and Intervention Services 
Recommendation 2: Create and Maintain One Website with Comprehensive 
Information about Sexual Assault 
Recommendation 3: Ensure Medical Care Resources, Including Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiner (SANE) Exams, are Available in Close Proximity to Campus 
Recommendation 4: Provide Resources for Students at all Three Campuses 
Primary Goal 2: Educate All Students About Sexual Assault 
Recommendation 5: Provide Comprehensive Training Campaign for All Students 
Recommendation 6: Create Targeted Training for Special Groups of Students: 
Fraternities and Sororities, Men, Student Athletes, and Others 
Recommendation 7: Develop and Initiate an Ongoing Robust Public Information 
Campaign 
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Primary Goal 3: Create a Community that Knows how to Respond and Provide 
Support 
Recommendation 8: Expand Bystander Training for Students, Academic Personnel, 
and Staff 
Recommendation 9: First Responder Training: Educate and Train on how to be 
Supportive and Respond if Someone Reveals She/He was Assaulted 
Recommendation 10: Train Staff and Academic Personnel on Their Reporting 
Requirements 
Primary Goal 4: Provide an Investigation and Disciplinary Process 
Appropriate for Sexual Assault 
Recommendation 11: Transform the Investigation and Disciplinary Process for 
Sexual Assault 
Primary Goal 5: Demonstrate Compliance with all Applicable Federal and 
State Laws, Regulations, and Guidance 
Recommendation 12: Ensure Compliance with Federal and State Laws, Regulations, 
and Guidance Related to Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assault  
Primary Goal 6: Generate Data, Metrics, and Reporting that Allow for Sound 
Decision Making 
Recommendation 13: Survey Students on Rates of Sexual Assault and Awareness of 
Campus Resources 
Recommendation 14: Gather, Track, and Assess Information at an Institutional Level 
Recommendation 15: Evaluate Program Effectiveness Regularly 
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Primary Goal 7: Establish Policies and Procedures that Set Direction, Clarify 
Intent, and Guide Coordinated Work 
Recommendation 16: Revise the Current Student Conduct Code Sexual Assault 
Investigation and Disciplinary Policy and Process 
Recommendation 17: Review, Revise, and Ensure Alignment of University Policies 
that Relate to Sexual Assault 
Primary Goal 8: Provide Effective Oversight and Follow Guiding Principles to 
Ensure Common Direction 
Recommendation 18: Provide Effective Oversight to Guide Strategic Direction of 
Task Force Recommendations 
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Analysis of Best and Worst Practices on College Campuses 
 Many similarities and differences exist between Florida State University, the 
University of Oregon, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of 
Washington. All four are large, public, Research I institutions serving as the flagship 
universities in their respective states. As such, sexual assault responsiveness on 
these campuses is held to a higher standard and receives more national attention, 
whether for positive or negative reasons. 
 Florida State University and the University of Oregon both demonstrated 
woefully inadequate polices and procedures when it came to sexual assault cases 
involving high-profile athletes on their campuses. In addition to significantly 
disenfranchising the accusers, Erica Kinsman at FSU and an anonymous female 
student at the University of Oregon, both of these institutions also did a disservice to 
the athletes accused in these cases. Because of Florida State University’s 
mishandling of the Winston case, there will always be media speculation that Jameis 
Winston is a rapist, suspicion that potentially could have been completely dismissed. 
Similarly, the extreme backlash against the University of Oregon’s methods of 
addressing the case involving Austin, Dotson, and Artis have all but condemned the 
three men as rapists in the eyes of the public, if not the law. It is possible that if the 
University of Oregon had properly responded to the allegations, instead of delaying 
all prosecution until after the basketball season had ended, the names of these three 
individuals would have been forever cleared. 
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 Such an analysis is barely scratching the surface of the issue, however. In 
order to adequately assess a situation involving sexual assault, factors of 
intersectionality must also be analyzed. The instance involving Jameis Winston and 
Erica Kinsman was not simply a woman accusing a man of sexually assaulting her, 
nor was it simply a female non student-athlete accusing a male student-athlete. It 
was also a white female accusing a black male, in the heart of Florida, a state with 
deep Southern roots. Recall an earlier analysis of the factors that come into play 
regarding an interracial sexual assault case: Jacquet discussed the conflicting tropes 
of the “black beast rapist” and the “lying woman,” typically a white woman. In this 
case, it is possible that such tropes were also at play, particularly because Winston’s 
physical attributes and skills were what made him so valuable to the FSU Athletics 
Department, and it was this value that made the Florida State football community so 
eager to portray Kinsman as a liar. 
 Although it is difficult to do as deep of a racial analysis for the University of 
Oregon case, as the race of the female accuser remains anonymous, it is certain that 
racial dynamics came into play in a situation involving the accusation of three black 
men. It is telling that, once the physical attributes of the men had dropped in value 
(i.e., once the basketball season was over), university administration chose to finally 
pursue the allegations. 
 However, what is possibly more salient in the University of Oregon case was 
the university’s attempts to discredit the female accuser using the “politics of 
respectability” analyzed earlier by McGuire. Recall that, according to McGuire’s 
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analysis (and some of Jacquet’s), only certain women were deemed “worthy” of 
protection under the law. These women were usually affluent or at least middle- to 
upper-middle class, conformed to a gender binary, and, most importantly, were not 
publicly sexually promiscuous or in any way considered anything less than mentally 
stable. The University of Oregon’s attempt to pry into the anonymous female 
student’s counseling records was a clear attempt to discredit the student by making 
her less respectable, as such records could have indicated a history of mental 
instability or, more damningly, sexual promiscuity. 
 These intersectional politics unfortunately also come into play in an analysis 
of the best practices on college campuses. Although the efforts of both the task force 
at the University of California, Berkeley, and the task force at the University of 
Washington are deeply admirable and certainly have made the climate regarding 
sexual assault on both campuses better than before the task forces’ convening, there 
were certain areas both task forces were lacking. Both task forces wished to focus 
on typically “high-risk” populations, including male students, student-athletes, and 
members of Greek organizations, but neither addressed the possible 
intersectionality within those groups; i.e. providing specific trainings for male 
student-athletes of color.  
 However, both task forces were able to address some issues of 
intersectionality. The UC Berkeley task force made a specific point that, while 
alcohol plays a large role in sexual assaults, not all sexual assaults take place under 
the influence of alcohol (recall Tillet’s earlier analysis of how too much of university 
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response to sexual assault is tailored to a party and “hookup” culture that not every 
student engages in). The UC task force argued that while aspects of alcohol 
education should be included in sexual assault trainings, there needed to be 
separate alcohol education and sexual assault awareness efforts so that the two 
areas were not always conflated. 
 The University of Washington task force also addressed areas of 
intersectionality that have yet to be addressed on other college campuses. In 
addition to recommending trainings for traditionally at-risk populations, the UW 
task force also recommended trainings for populations of students that may not 
necessarily be the first to come to mind when discussing sexual assault perpetrators 
or survivors on college campuses: faith-based communities, students of color, 
LGBTQ students, military and veterans, and international students. Although 
specific recommendations weren’t issued for these students, recognizing that these 
populations likely have different needs based on their multiple identities is a step in 
the right direction. 
 Sexual assault on college campuses is a tragedy that likely will never be able 
to be entirely prevented. However, college and university campuses can make 
significant efforts to provide the most effective policies and procedures for their 
students. Because of the complex, multilayered nature of sexual assault cases, 
particularly cases involving intersectionality, it is likely that no one set of policies 
and procedures will ever be determined for all campuses, or even for all cases on 
one specific campus. However, an analysis of several cases and instances of revised 
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policies and procedures on large, public, Research I universities can help to 
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Appendicies 
 
Appendix A. University of California, Berkeley Task Force Participants 
 
Name Title 
Karen Leong Clancy UC Regent 
Bonnie Reiss UC Regent 
Sadia Saifuddin Student Regent 
Sheryl Vacca Task Force Lead, Senior Vice President & 
Chief Compliance and Audit Officer 
Deidre Acker Advisor to the Regents 
Rishi Ahuja Undergraduate Student 
Susan Allen-Ortega Associate Vice Chancellor/Dean of 
Students 
Adele Anfinson Director of Student Health Services 
Savannah Badalich Undergraduate Student 
Margo Bennett Chief of Police 
Lori Chamberlain Director of the Office for the Prevention 
of Harassment & Discrimination 
Wendi Delmendo Chief Compliance Officer 
Jill Dunlap Director, Campus Advocacy, Resources & 
Education Women’s Center 
Jerlena Griffin-Desta Deputy to the Vice President and 
Executive Director, Student Services 
Paul Henisey Chief of Police 
James D. Herren Chief of Police 
Hallie Hunt Director, Center for Student Conduct and 
Assistant Dean of Students 
David Lane Systemwide Deputy Compliance Officer 
Janet Lockwood Manager, Academic Policy and 
Compensation 
David Lopez-Carr Professor of Geography, UCSB Chair, 
University Committee on Affirmative 
Action and Diversity 
Janina Montero Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs 
Luanna Putney Associate Chancellor 
Emily Roxworthy Professor of Theater, UCSD Chair, 
University Committee on Affirmative 
Action 
Eleanor Skarakis Chief of Staff to the Vice President of 
Human Resources & Director of HR 
Policy 
Caitlin Stinneford Sexual Violence Prevention Educator 
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Holly Swift Graduate Student 
Pamela Thomason Sexual Harassment Coordinator/Title IX 
Officer 
Linda Williams Associate Vice Chancellor 
Allison Woodall Deputy General Counsel 
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Response and Reporting Recommendations 
 
Recommendation 1: Establish a Consistent “Response Team” Model at all Campuses 
 The task force recommended the creation of two teams to respond to sexual 
violence and assault. The first team would be “comprised of student conduct, Title 
IX, campus police, and advocacy [and would] maintain consistent coordination of all 
reported cases, provide case management for all ongoing cases, and ensure all cases 
are addressed efficiently and effectively” (Vacca et al., 2014), essentially serving as 
an overseeing body for all sexual assault cases on a UC campus. The second team 
would include “sexual violence/sexual assault advocates, Title IX officers, campus 
and local police, student conduct, student health and counseling, residential life 
programs, LGBTQ, cross-culture, and gender-related centers, student government 
representatives, and local rape crisis or community service representatives” and 
would coordinate what amounts to a comprehensive research and marketing plan to 
stay informed on legal policies and procedures and promoting the response team’s 
work to the campus and local community. 
 
Recommendation 2: Adopt Systemwide, Standard Investigation and Adjudication 
Standards 
 This recommendation is essentially a charge for all UC campuses to stay 
appraised of current research and federal/state mandates regarding sexual assault 
in order for the University of California to “be the national leader in preventing and 
combating sexual violence and sexual assault” (Vacca et al., 2014) Specifically, at the 
time of publication, the task force recommended review of the Campus SaVE Act, the 
2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, the Association 
for Student Conduct Administration 2014 White Paper on Student Conduct 
Administration & Title IX: Gold Standard Practices for Resolution of Allegations of 
Sexual Misconduct on College Campuses, Not Alone: The First Report of the White 
House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, Survey of Campus Sexual 
Violence Policies and Procedures, and the California State Auditor Report on Sexual 





Recommendation 3: Comprehensive Training and Education Plan 
 The task force argued for the creation of a training plan that was tailored to 
specific populations and regularly evaluated for effectiveness and inclusivity. This 
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training plan would include “a mandate to participate in training and education 
concerning sexual violence and sexual assault, dating/domestic violence and 
stalking” for all incoming UC students, as well as a strong recommendation for a 
similar training for faculty and staff, with required faculty/staff training for “job 
based roles with particular responsibilities, including student health and counseling 
staff, police, advocates, residential life staff, Title IX officers, student conduct officers 
and hearing panels” (Vacca et al., 2014). Additionally, the task force recommended 
supplemental training for students belonging to statistically high-risk populations 
(i.e. Greek life, student athletes) (University of Nevada, Reno, 2015).  
 
Recommendation 4: Implement Comprehensive Communication Strategy to Educate 
the Community and Raise Awareness about UC Programs 
 The task force recommended the creation of a communications strategy 
adapted to campus culture, while still incorporating both current campus and 
national campaigns as well as student input. The goal would be to provide 
information regarding “risk reduction, affirmative consent, survivor support, and 
the fair and objective adjudication process for those accused” (Vacca et al., 2014). 
 
 
Prevention/Advocacy/Response Recommendations  
 
Recommendation 5: Establish an Independent Confidential Advocacy Office for 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault on Each Campus 
 The main goal of this recommendation would be to create a confidential 
advocacy office that is independent of any other university entity (i.e., not housed 
under the umbrella of an Office of Student Conduct, Police Services, Residential Life, 
etc.). This office would be dedicated solely to “providing confidential advocacy, 
facilitating with case management of reported complaints, establishing education 
and prevention content, supporting education programming and providing 
professional training in coordination with key stakeholders, and providing input to 
policy creation and revision” (Vacca et al., 2014). The task force also emphasized the 
need for an office that is physically accessible but simultaneously in a discreet 
enough locale that students feel comfortable visiting it and still protecting their 
anonymity.  
 
Recommendation 6: Establish a Comprehensive Systemwide Website with Campus 
Customization Capabilities 
 The task force recommended a UC website to provide information to all UC 
constituents regarding sexual assault and steps the university has taken to raise 
awareness and prevention. This website would “contain common information, 
nomenclature, and functions such as: how to report, where to go for confidential 
help, how to receive accommodations, information on SVSA policies, and how to 
support a friend who has experienced sexual violence” (Vacca et al., 2014). The goal 
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of the website would be to provide another resource for students who may not feel 





Recommendation 7: Systemwide Standard Data Collection 
 A method of data collection that tracks “common themes regarding sexual 
violence, domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, and sexual assault” would 
allow for the UC system to analyze trends and further tailor their responses to these 
problems on their campus (Vacca et al., 2014). The task force recommended the 
creation of such a system so that the changes implemented through the other 
recommendations, such as the awareness trainings, communication strategy, 
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Appendix C. University of Washington Task Force Participants 
 
Name Title 
Ellen Taylor (Chair) Assistant Vice President for Student Life, 
and Director of Counseling Center 
Elizabeth Coveney Associate Vice President, HR 
Administration and Information Systems 
David Eaton Dean and Vice Provost, Graduate School 
Brian Fabien Chair, Faculty Council on Student Affairs 
Cedric Howard Vice Chancellor, Student Services, UW 
Tacoma 
Shelley Kostrinsky Assistant Vice Provost for Academic 
Personnel 
Amanda Paye Title IX Coordinator, Office of Risk 
Management 
Stephanie Rempe Senior Associate Athletic Director 
Robin Sacks Student, Associated Students of UW 
(ASUW) representative 
Kimberley Schertz Student, Graduate and Professional 
Student Senate (GPSS) representative 
Pam Schreiber Director, Housing and Food Services 
Naomi Sugar, M.D. Clinical Professor of Pediatrics, 
Harborview and Children’s Hospital 
Ed Taylor Vice Provost and Dean, Undergraduate 
Academic Affairs 
George Theo Dean of Student Affairs, UW Bothell 
John Vinson Chief, UW Police Department 
Susan Freccia Project Manager, Task Force on Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response 
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Primary Goal 1: Have a Visible, Robust, Easily-Accessible, Collaborative 
Network of Response and Intervention Services for Students in Need. 
 
Recommendation 1: Develop Roles and Clarify Process Among Departments 
Providing Response and Intervention Services 
 The task force created this recommendation in response to what they saw as 
“role confusion, gaps in services, or bottlenecks in administrative processes” 
resulting from a disorganized network of support services on the UW campus, 
including student conduct offices, the University of Washington Police Department, 
counseling centers, and the Title IX Coordinator (Freccia et al., 2013). To fix it, they 
recommended the creation of a working committee to review and oversee 
collaboration between the various on-campus departments. 
 
Recommendation 2: Create and Maintain One Website with Comprehensive 
Information about Sexual Assault 
 At the time of the task force’s convening, information regarding “resources, 
FAQ’s, policies, and programs relating to sexual assault” was spread across multiple 
websites, hosted by experts in each content area, but with no overarching central 
web location for students to access all of the information at once (Freccia et al., 
2013). The task force recommended that such a website be created through the 
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. 
 
Recommendation 3: Ensure Medical Care Resources, Including Sexual Assault Nurse 
Examiner (SANE) Exams, are Available in Close Proximity to Campus 
 The task force determined that a large gap in providing adequate resources 
to survivors of sexual assault was in the administration of SANE exams (also known 
as “rape kits”) in a location close to the UW campus. They recommended the UW 
medical facilities be equipped with the resources to perform the exams, or, at the 
very least, transportation to the closest facility that can perform the exams be 
provided free of charge to all students. 
 
Recommendation 4: Provide Resources for Students at all Three Campuses 
 To ensure that no one UW campus is better equipped to handle sexual assault 
cases than another UW campus, the task force recommended the creation of a 
Deputy Title IX Coordinator for each UW campus that is specifically tasked with 
handling and addressing sexual assault cases. 
 
 
Primary Goal 2: Educate All Students About Sexual Assault 
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Recommendation 5: Provide Comprehensive Training Campaign for All Students 
 The task force recognized that several on-campus departments were already 
providing beneficial and effective training to raise awareness of sexual assault and 
the need for prevention, including Health & Wellness, Intercollegiate Athletics (ICA), 
First Year Programs (FYP), and Fraternity and Sorority Life. However, they argue 
that “because research indicates that students in their first few weeks of college are 
at particularly high risk for sexual assault, it is imperative that training occur at 
orientation. Additional training should follow at multiple points during the first 
year, as well as during subsequent years of college and for graduate and 
professional students” (Freccia et al., 2013).  Since such training was not currently 
available for students in populations outside of those served by the departments 
mentioned above, the task force recommended that the Sexual Assault Prevention 
and Response Program develop a collaborative effort with those and other on-
campus departments to provide such a training for all students. 
 
Recommendation 6: Create Targeted Training for Special Groups of Students: 
Fraternities and Sororities, Men, Student Athletes, and Others 
 The task force recognized that “training and education for special groups is 
an effective means to reach affinity groups, build relationships and employ peer-to-
peer training. Stereotypes, myths, accessibility and varying cultural norms and 
expectations require sensitive but honest and straightforward approaches to 
content and process” (Freccia et al., 2013). Appropriately, the task force 
recommended the creation of a men’s committee to assess methods of educating 
men regarding “respect, violence prevention, gender socialization process, and 
consent;” the enhancement of collaboration between ICA and the Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Response Program to continue to provide top-notch trainings for 
student athletes; and further enhancement of the collaboration between UW 
administration and the recognized fraternities and sororities to ensure the 
continuation of trainings for those populations as well.  
 
Recommendation 7: Develop and Initiate an Ongoing Robust Public Information 
Campaign 
 The task force recommended the creation of a campaign disseminating 
information about “consent, resources, social norms, and institutional expectations” 
through the means of email list servs, social media, mobile apps, posters, and 
whatever other means would make the information accessible to members of a 
specific campus culture (Freccia et al., 2013).  
 
 
Primary Goal 3: Create a Community that Knows how to Respond and Provide 
Support 
 
Recommendation 8: Expand Bystander Training for Students, Academic Personnel, 
and Staff 
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 The task force urged the expansion of staffing levels to allow for a full-scale 
implementation of the GreenDot program, which “encourages any behavior, choice, 
word, or attitude that promotes safety for all our citizens and communicates utter 
intolerance for violence” (Freccia et al., 2013). They felt that the current, volunteer-
based program was not enough to reach every member of the campus community 
and that it would be beneficial to allocate resources towards the program’s 
expansion. 
 
Recommendation 9: First Responder Training: Educate and Train on how to be 
Supportive and Respond if Someone Reveals She/He was Assaulted 
 The task force argued that an ideal campus culture would be one in which 
“every person knows how to respond, provide support, and point [a sexual assault 
survivor] in the direction of services” (Freccia et al., 2013). This recommendation 
was designed to be coordinate with training efforts mentioned in Recommendations 
8 and 10. 
 
Recommendation 10: Train Staff and Academic Personnel on Their Reporting 
Requirements 
 At the time of the task force’s convening, Health & Wellness had implemented 
Incident Response Training to undergraduate academic advisors, as well as ICA 
staff. The task force recommended “expanded service provider capacity, 
endorsement and institutional support from university administration, as well as 
partnering with Human Resources and Academic Personnel” in order to require 
such training for all faculty and staff. 
 
 
Primary Goal 4: Provide an Investigation and Disciplinary Process 
Appropriate for Sexual Assault 
 
Recommendation 11: Transform the Investigation and Disciplinary Process for 
Sexual Assault 
 The task force recognized that the current investigative processes employed 
by the various police services affiliated with UW campuses were highly effective and 
provided a model for other sexual assault investigative and disciplinary entities. 
These entities included Student Conduct, an office possessing “limited resources for 
investigation and adjudication, combined with a Student Conduct Code that has not 
been significantly updated for many years” (Freccia et al., 2013). The task force 
recommended the temporary hire of a consultant to update the Student Conduct 
Code and enact other policy revisions within Student Conduct.  
 
 
Primary Goal 5: Demonstrate Compliance with all Applicable Federal and  
State Laws, Regulations, and Guidance 
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Recommendation 12: Ensure Compliance with Federal and State Laws, Regulations, 
and Guidance Related to Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assault  
 This recommendation served as a reminder for UW administration to make 
sure that, when implementing all other recommendations, the university stays 
compliant with federal and state laws and regulations regarding sexual assault on 
college campuses, due to the current “heightened regulatory environment” (Freccia 
et al., 2013). Such laws and regulations included Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights April 2011 
Dear Colleague Letter, the Jeanne Cleary Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and 
Campus Crime Statistics Act, the 2013 Reauthorization of the Violence Against 
Women Act, the Campus SaVE Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Chapter 
49.60 RCW – the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Chapter 28B.110 RCW – 
Gender Equality in Higher Education, and Chapter 26.44 RCW – Abuse of Children 
Law (Freccia et al., 2013).  
 
 
Primary Goal 6: Generate Data, Metrics, and Reporting that Allow for Sound 
Decision Making 
 
Recommendation 13: Survey Students on Rates of Sexual Assault and Awareness of 
Campus Resources 
 The task force reflected on the data gathered by an April 2011 Safety Survey 
at the University of Washington, and recommended the continuation of such a 
survey and expansion to all UW campuses (Freccia et al., 2013. 
 
Recommendation 14: Gather, Track, and Assess Information at an Institutional Level 
 The task force also recommended data collection through identification and 
tracking of all reported sexual assault cases, making sure to maintain student 
confidentiality (Freccia et al., 2013. 
 
Recommendation 15: Evaluate Program Effectiveness Regularly 
 The task force recognized the lack of a collaborative effort across multiple 
UW offices to “identify appropriate metrics, collect baseline data, and develop a 
program effectiveness assessment plan” to evaluate the UW approach to 
“prevention, education, response, service utilization and attrition, and climate 
improvement” (Freccia et al., 2013). However, such an effort could not come to pass 
until Recommendations 1 and 14 are implemented. 
 
 
Primary Goal 7: Establish Policies and Procedures that Set Direction, Clarify 
Intent, and Guide Coordinated Work 
 
Recommendation 16: Revise the Current Student Conduct Code Sexual Assault 
Investigation and Disciplinary Policy and Process 
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 The task force referred to Recommendation 11 for detail on this 
recommendation (Freccia et al., 2013). 
 
Recommendation 17: Review, Revise, and Ensure Alignment of University Policies 
that Relate to Sexual Assault 
 The task force called for consistency regarding definitions, policy, and 
process relating to sexual assault, with a specific emphasis on Executive Order 31, 
referring to non-discrimination and affirmative action (Freccia et al., 2013.  
 
 
Primary Goal 8: Provide Effective Oversight and Follow Guiding Principles to 
Ensure Common Direction 
 
Recommendation 18: Provide Effective Oversight to Guide Strategic Direction of 
Task Force Recommendations 
 The task force requested authority to oversee and ensure progress on all 
implemented recommendations, with an evaluative report containing ongoing 
recommendations being published in November 2014 (Freccia et al., 2013).  
 
